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LAW AND HISTORY
John PhillipReid*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A venture into cross-disciplinary legal studies may be a mark of
scholarly sophistication for the law academic, but it does not do to assume the benefits without understanding the risks. Serious problems result from the crossing of disciplines. Take the crossing of history with
law: It is a mixture containing more snares than rewards, as it risks confusing rules of evidence basic to one profession with canons of proof sacrosanct to another.
True, there are those who feel the mix takes well. For example,
consider Alfred H. Kelly, a scholar of history well versed in constitutional law but who apparently had only a layman's knowledge of nonconstitutional law. He thought the connection of methodology between law
and history not only easy to locate, but a fairly close match.' They not
only shared intellectual substance, he explained, but the materials used in
each are also the same.2 Writing in a legal publication in 1965, Kelly
stated that
[t]here is, after all, a fairly close relationship between the dayto-day methodology of the judicial process and that of historical scholarship. When a court ascertains the nature of the law
to be applied to a case through an examination of a stream of
judicial precedent, after the time-honored Anglo-American
technique, it plays the role of historian. A historian might
well say that in this process the court goes to the "primary
3
sources."
The implication-one that is shared by lawyers perhaps even more
than by historians-is that there is a similarity between the methodology
* Professor, New York University; B.S.S., 1952, Georgetown University; LL.B., 1955,
Harvard University; M.A., 1957, University of New Hampshire; LL.M., 1960, J.S.D., 1962,
New York University; Fellow, Guggenheim Foundation, 1980; Fellow, Huntington Library,
1980; NEH Fellow, 1984. Research for this Essay was supported by the Filomen D'Agostino
Greenberg and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund at New York University School of
Law. The Author appreciates the helpful suggestions of Richard B. Bernstein.
1. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Cr.REV. 119,
121.
2. Id.

3. Id.
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of law and the methodology of history. Indeed, the argument goes much
further than process. It is not just techniques or procedure that the two
disciplines have in common; they share substance as well. Certainly
there have been times when first-year law students thought so. At least
we can imagine that many would have agreed with the Chief Justice of
the United States Supreme Court when he suggested in 1957 that in real
property classes they were learning legal history. "All lawyers are, of
course, in some sense students of legal history," Earl Warren contended.'
"The knowledge of medieval law, which is essential to the most elementary understanding of our land law, is an obvious example."'
What was obvious to Earl Warren could be quite obscure to other
people. Warren would have been correct had he said that first-year law
students often learn the name of old, even medieval judicial landmarks,
such as the Rule in Shelley's Case.' They do not, however, learn what
the decision stood for when first promulgated, and they certainly do not
learn about it as a development in the context of legal history. Indeed,
had Warren understood what he was writing, even he might have drawn
back from saying that "[a]ll lawyers are ...in some sense students of
legal history."7 After all, since Earl Warren came to the bar, no American or English lawyer needs "knowledge of medieval law" for even "the
most elementary understanding of our land law." Why should they if
their teachers do not? If we could gather thirty or forty American or
Canadian professors of real property into a room, it is possible that none
present could explain what Shelley's Case meant when first promulgated
in 1579. They would know that in 1579 a gift of the Pussycat Bar and
Grill to Gerald T. McLaughlin for life, remainder to his right heirs, did
not grant a life interest to the grantee, but that the life estate and the
remainder merged into a fee simple absolute.8 They have no professional
reason for learning that McLaughlin had hoped the interest he conveyed
to his heirs would allow his heirs to escape the incidents of tenure owed
either to the lord who held the Pussycat Bar and Grill or to the Crown.
Had his heirs taken by remainder, rather than descent, they would have
avoided paying relief, and perhaps, avoided wardship.9
Simply stated, the law student, the law professor, or the practitioner,
when grappling with the Rule in Shelley's Case, is interested only in the
4. Earl Warren, Introduction to 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1 (1957).
5. Id.
6. Wolfe v. Shelley, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1579).
7. Warren, supra note 4, at 1.
S. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE
96 (1961).
9. Id. at 94-95.
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latest interpretation of the rule-the last decision in the jurisdictionand nothing else. Lawyers, to function as lawyers, do not have to learn
anything of sixteenth-century law, or of the rule's subsequent historical
evolution. All that lawyers need care about is the net result of that
evolution, the latest judicial, nonhistoricalappraisal or interpretation of
the rule. In a frequently quoted paragraph from his inaugural lecture as
Downing Professor of the Laws of England at Cambridge University in
1888, Frederic William Maitland explained:
In his first text-book the student is solemnly warned that he
must know the law as it stood in Edward I's day, and unfortunately it is quite impossible to write the simplest book about
our land-law without speaking of the De Donis and the Quia
Emptores. Well, a stranger might exclaim, what a race of medievalists you English lawyers ought to be! But on enquiry we
shall find that the practical necessity for a little knowledge is a
positive obstacle to the attainment of more knowledge and also
that what is really required of the practicing lawyer is not, save
in the rarest cases, a knowledge of medieval law as it was in the
middle ages, but rather a knowledge of medieval law as interpreted by modern courts to suit modern facts. A lawyer finds
on his table a case about the rights of common which sends him
to the Statute of Merton. But is it really the law of 1236 that he
wants to know? No, it is the ultimate result of the interpretations set on the statute by the judges of twenty generations.
The more modem the decision the more valuable for his
purpose. l
The lawyer and the historian have in common the fact that they go
to the past for evidence, but there the similarity largely ends. Some historians, such as Kelly, believe that common-law methodology requires
the lawyer to play "the role of historian" and to go "to the 'primary
sources.' , For such historians, Maitland warned there is a temptation
"to mix up two different logics, the logic of authority, and the logic of
evidence." 12 The differences in the logics are the differences that Kelly
missed. They are so basic that they make the ways that the two professions interpret the past almost incompatible. In discovering the past, the
10. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, Why the History of English Law Is Not Written, in 1 THE
COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 480, 490-91 (H.A.L. Fisher ed.,
1911).
11. Kelly, supra note 1, at 121.
12. MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 491.
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historian weighs every bit of evidence that comes to hand. The lawyer,
13

by contrast, is after the single authority that will settle the case at bar.

The search for authority, the need to find "the law" or "the right
law" is the main reason lawyers speak of the legal past in terms quite

different from the historian's. J.W. Gough described how common
lawyers

look at the past from an unhistorical standpoint. In the English
lawyer's view, a judge who applies a law to a fresh case elucidates what was always, potentially as it were, the law on that

particular matter. One interpretation of the law may have been
accepted for years, and then suddenly be reversed by a decision
in a fresh case in a higher court, whereupon the new decision
holds the field and the old interpretation is discarded as errone-

ous. Again, when a statute, let us say, has been applied over a
long period of years, in changing circumstances, to a succession

of cases, and has thus accumulated round it a whole nexus of
judge-made law, the historian and the lawyer will look at the
original statute in a different light. The historian will want to
know what the statute meant to the generation which enacted

it, apart from the ways in which subsequent judges have
adapted their interpretations of it to fresh circumstances. For
the lawyer, on the other hand, these successive interpretations

reveal the true meaning of the law. Not only, therefore, does
the lawyer's business, unlike the historian's, lie not so much

with what the statute originally meant as with what it means
now, but he will be inclined, unless he is careful, to imagine
13. Maitland states:
What the lawyer wants is authority and the newer the better; what the historian
wants is evidence and the older the better. This when stated is obvious; but often we
conceal it from ourselves under some phrase about "the common law." It is possible
to find in modem books comparisons between what Bracton says and what [Sir Edward] Coke says about the law as it stood before the statutes of Edward I, and the
writer of course tells us that Coke's is "the better opinion." Now if we want to know
the common law of our own day, Coke's authority is higher than Bracton's and
Coke's own doctrines yield easily to modem decisions. But if we are really looking
for the law of Henry III's reign, Bracton's lightest word is infinitely more valuable
than all the tomes of Coke. A mixture of legal dogma and legal history is in general
an unsatisfactory compound. I do not say that there are not judgments and textbooks which have achieved the difficult task of combining the results of deep historical research with luminous and accurate exposition of existing law-neither confounding the dogma nor perverting the history; but the task is difficult.
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that the statute always, at any rate potentially, meant what it
14
has since come to be interpreted to mean.
Our lesson is not that the lawyer is uninterested in the original
meaning of the statute. Our lesson, rather, is that the lawyer needs another meaning. The concept of that other meaning-the legal, or what
Gough called "the true meaning"-leads lawyers, unless they are on
their historical guard, to commingle the current interpretation of the law
with the historical interpretation. Common lawyers tend to be anachronistic, not merely because they are advocates, but because of the way
they think and speak about the past.
II.

LAWYER'S LAW OFFICE HISTORY

The way that lawyers think about history is an eccentricity foisted
on them by their professional training and, although it may amuse historians who stumble over lawyering anachronisms, 1 5 it is not a matter of
controversy among lawyers. What has been controversial is the way that
lawyers argue and use history. Critics of their methodology have coined
terms to describe it. They call it lawyer's history or law office history. 6
Lawyer's history and law office history are really the same despite the
variety of definitions they have been given. Lawyer's history has been
called "a stark, crabbed, oversimplified picture of the past, developed
largely to plead a case,"' 7 and law office history has been described as
"the selection of data favorable to the position being advanced without
regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the
relevance of the data proffered." 18 "The 'law office historian,'" one
critic has argued, "imbued with the adversary ethic, selectively recounts
facts, emphasizing data that supports the recorder's own prepossessions
and minimizing significant facts that complicate or conflict with that
bias.""
No better discussion of the technique may exist than Benjamin R.
Twiss's account of William M. Evarts's argument before the New York
14. J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 6-7

(Fred B. Rothman & Co. ed., Clarendon Press 1985) (1955).
15. For the most extended instance of the historian's amusement, see J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW (1987).

16. Kelly, supra note 1, at 119-22.
17. Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Brief. From Friendship to Advocacy, in ESSAYS ON THE

AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 77, 80 (Gottfried Dietze ed., 1964).
18. Kelly, supra note 1, at 122 n.13.
19. Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and Bills Number 82-86 of the Revision of the
Laws of Virginia, 1776-1786: New Light on the JeffersonianModel of Church-State Relations,
69 N.C. L. REV. 159, 210 n.293 (1990).

198
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Court of Appeals in the Tenement House CigarCase.2" Evarts was challenging the constitutionality of an early instance of labor regulation-a
state statute prohibiting the manufacture of cigars in certain types of
family dwellings. Referring to Evarts's claim that citizens had a right to
pursue a trade and to use their own property as they saw fit, Twiss
concluded:
Evarts not being a historian but a lawyer, it must be called
"lawyer's history" when he said, "Ethical and political writers
speak but one language on the nature of these fundamental
rights and their security against rightful interference by government." Such a statement can be true only in a brief.2
Recently, sarcasm about lawyer's history has even crept into the reports of its most persistent practitioners, the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court. In a rather extreme instance of the pot calling the kettle
black, Justice Harry A. Blackmun scolded Justice Antonin E. Scalia for
they
treating "history as a grab-bag of principles, to be adopted where
22
support the Court's theory, and ignored where they do not."
What can be called either historical jurisprudence or historical adjudication has become a characteristic of Supreme Court opinions only
over the past several decades. Just why it came into fashion puzzled
Mark DeWolfe Howe.
I suspect that Justice Brandeis played a large part in making
elaborate historical investigation an instrument of decision. He
brought the data of the past out into the open in order to reveal
the complexity of a problem, rather than to indicate the simplicity of its answer. As time passed, his style of adjudication
took hold of the minds and habits of his colleagues and successors, and before very long progressive elementary essays in
American history [ 2 31-essays which displayed all the trappings
20. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
21. BENJAMIN R. TwIss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAIRE
CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 104 (1962).
22. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2917 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
23. Historian Kelly noted that there were
two fundamental types of historical inquiry on the part of the Court: the resort to
history to discover "original intent," and the exposition of history as "on-going process." "Intent" history, the simpler of the two, assumes that the original purpose
and meaning of a given constitutional provision can be discovered and brought to
bear as sanction for contemporary constitutional exposition. It was "intent" history,
for example, that Justice Black invoked in his dubious opinion in Westberry v. Sanders (1964), in which he argued that the Philadelphia Convention had incorporated
the "one-man, one vote" principle in the Constitution. The great weakness of "intent
history" is that it assumes that the Constitution is a timeless document, whereas in
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of scholarship, but which were not the manifestations of true
learning because they were tracts for the times.24
Paul L. Murphy, a constitutional historian who, unlike Howe, was
not a lawyer, was less puzzled about why the Supreme Court adopted
historical jurisprudence. Murphy concluded that
a turn to history was essential. This trend was brought to fruition in 1931 in cases involving freedom of speech, 2 51 and freedom of the press,1 26] and later extended by application to
freedom of assembly in 1937,E27 and the "free exercise" section
of the religious provisions of the First Amendment with a long
series of Jehovah's Witnesses' rulings between 1938 and 1946.
These cases necessitated a clear reassessment both of the actual
intent of the framers of that amendment and the development
and rationale of fifty years of erosion of the amendment as a
device for the protection of individual rights.28
Kelly agreed that the rise ofjudicial activism was responsible for the
trend toward historical adjudication. However, he thought the cause was
less the utility of history than the way history or suppositive history
could be used to blunt or disguise that activism.
By this means, the Court could maintain with a minimum of
difficulty the myth of historical continuity, i.e., the conception
of an essentially static and absolute Constitution. Once ultimate truth was thus affirmed, subsequent Courts, equipped
with the aboriginal constitutional meaning, were quite content
to quote the Court's earlier affirmation without further historical inquiry. In a sense, by quoting history, the Court made hispoint of fact it is, as the author observes, "no longer the instrument of the framers'
government, but of our own."
More sophisticated and complex, is the Court's resort to "on-going history"that which recognizes the evolutionary character both of the "living constitution"
and of the social order within which it functions.
Alfred H. Kelly, Book Review, 57 J. AM. HIsT. 483, 484 (1970) (reviewing and quoting
CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE UsES OF HISTORY (1969)).

24. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Split Decisions, 4 N.Y. REV. BooKs 14, 16 (1965).
25. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); see also Griffin v. United States, 112 S.
Ct. 466 (199 1) (limiting application of Stromberg to principle that where provision of Constitution forbids conviction on particular ground, constitutional guarantee is violated by general
verdict that may have rested on that ground).
26. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
27. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
28. Paul L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The CurrentChallenge ofAmerican Constitutional
History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64, 75 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
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tory,t2 93 since what it declared history to be was frequently
more important than what the history might actually have
been.3 0
Howe, primarily a law professor 31 and only incidently a historian,
put the matter in harsher terms and used more critical language than
Kelly:
In recent years the Court has decided a number of important
cases relating to church and state and, in each of the cases, has
alleged that the command of history, not the preference of the
justices, has brought the Court to its decision. I believe that in
the matters at issue the Court has too often pretended that the
dictates of the nation's history, rather than the mandates of its
own will, compelled a particular decision.32
In defense of the Court, Kelly pleaded mitigating circumstances.
"The Court's historical excursions," he explained, "are related to its extremely difficult double socio-political role-the maintenance and enunciation of 'a political-legal order through formal adjudication,' and the
preservation of 'the social-political bonds of the nation.' , However, it
was the lawyer, Mark DeWolfe Howe, who doubted if the difficulty of
the Supreme Court's task was an excuse either for adopting historical
adjudication or for how the Justices have used, argued, and in general,
manipulated history.
This tension between the complexities of confused reality and
the simplicities of sure conviction has, very probably, always
marked the divisions within the Court. Only within recent
years, however, have the Justices who have discovered and embraced the solacing simplicities endeavored to persuade us that
a careful reading of history confirms their confidence. If they
29. Among the stupendous powers of the Supreme Court of the United States, there
are two which in logic may be independent and yet in fact are related. The one is the
power, through an articulate search for principle, to interpret history. The other is
the power, through the disposition of cases, to make it.
MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 3 (1965).

30. Kelly, supra note 1, at 123.
31. It may be that as a lawyer I take the Court's distorting lessons in American intellectual history too seriously. I must remind you, however, that a great many Americans-lawyers and non-lawyers alike-tend to think that because a majority of the
justices have the power to bind us by their law they are also empowered to bind us by
their history.
HOWE, supra note 29, at 4-5.

32. Id. at 4.
33. Kelly, supra note 23, at 484 (quoting CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969)).
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have not always succeeded in this effort, they have at least

taught us that a selective interpretation of history can provide
much satisfaction to the interpreter.34

Often, however, it provides little satisfaction to observers of the
American judicial process-lawyers 35 as well as nonlawyers. 36 They
have voiced several objections to law office history as practiced by twentieth-century American courts. Here are three.

A. Law Office History is Not History According to the Canons of the
Academic HistoricalMethod
Law office history is "antithetical to the use of history to ascertain

objective truth. ' 37 The United States Supreme Court, for example, in
"virtually all" of its historical adjudication, "either relied upon archaic

historical works of the earlier devotees of '[judicially] revealed' history,
turned to history written by nonhistorians, or trusted its own ability to
reconstruct historical evidence from the sources themselves. ' 38 The

complaint is that the judges and Justices disguise advocacy in the mantle
of history; yet, no matter how persuasive to lawyers, historians know it is

not history. 9
34. Howe, supra note 24, at 16.
35. For some of the more interesting criticism of historical jurisprudence at its prime, see
William W. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the ConstitutionalLimitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?. The Original Understanding,2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949); Lewis Mayers, The Habeas CorpusAct of 1867 The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 31 (1965); Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865,
32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243 (1965); John G. Wofford, The BlindingLight: The Uses of History in
ConstitutionalInterpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964).
36. For sophisticated criticism published in a historical journal, see J.R. Wiggins, Lawyers
as Judges of History, 75 PROC. MASS. HisT. Soc'y 84, 84-104 (1964). The author says of Clio:
"The unfortunate muse, harried by subpoena, harassed by cross examination, subjected to ex
parte proceedings, and lectured by the courts, has not spoken with a clear voice in every attendant proceeding." Id. at 84.
37. Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Supreme Court's Use and Abuse of History, ORGANIZATION AM. HISTORIANS NEWSL., Aug. 1983, at 7, 9.
38. Murphy, supra note 28, at 77.
39. Howe thought this "disguised advocacy" made much historical adjudication close to
misrepresentation.
It is the common-law tradition, perhaps, which leads the Court and those who study
its processes to assume (or had I better say "pretend"?) that the history which is
made by the Court's decisions is merely the realization of the past which the learning
of the justices and their clerks has uncovered. The judge as statesman, purporting to
be the servant of the judge as historian, often asks us to believe that the choices that
he makes-the rules of law that he establishes for the nation-are the dictates of a
past which his abundant and uncommitted scholarship has discovered.
HowE, supra note 29, at 3-4.
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If law office history of this kind appeared only in a brief for
counsel, it conceivably would do no harm. But the fact is that

law office history is almost completely irresolvable, even by the
Supreme Court of the United States, into anything resembling

historical truth, in large part because the premises that guided
its preparation were radically different from those that should
guide a professional historian. 4°
B. Law Office History "'Asks Questions of the Past That the Past
Cannot Answer"

Law office history "asks questions of the past that the past cannot
answer."4 1 This occurs generally from two causes. First, judges often

read the records of the past as if they were prepared similarly to the
legislative history of today's congresses, by professional staffs anticipating issues likely to arise in litigation.42 They read, for example, eighteenth-century evidence as if it were formulated to meet twentieth-century

standards, and hold the record to a measure of accuracy that simply is
not there.43 Second, they ask the past to answer questions about matters
that were not thought of at the time.

This difficulty shows up most clearly in the resort to history by
the [United States Supreme] Court in the cases concerning the
relations of church and state. The church-state matters to
which Jefferson, Madison, Fisher Ames, and the others of the

First Congress were addressing themselves are not resolvable
by any plausible process of historical reasoning into a solution
of the problem of aid for parochial schools, lunch programs,
bus transportation, released time.'
40. Kelly, supra note 1, at 156.
41. Id.
42. A striking instance of this is the judiciary's almost deliberate misreading of the Intercourse Act (which courts persist in misnaming the "Nonintercourse Act"). Intercourse Act
(Indian Tribes), ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834) (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 177, 179, 180, 193,
194, 201, 229, 251, 263, 264 (1988)). At the time it was enacted, and for decades afterward,
everyone knew the Act did not apply to Indians living within states; but holding the Congress
of 1790 to twentieth-century standards of drafting, the courts have ignored history to reach a
desired result. See, e.g., Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d
370 (Ist Cir. 1975).
43. For a splendid expos6 of the problem, see James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1986).
44. Kelly, supra note 1, at 156-57.
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C.

Too Often Law Office History Is a Blatant Abuse
of the HistoricalMethod

Historians have particularly singled out Hugo Black for criticism.
He had a talent for constructing historical arguments that were caricatures of what academics understand to be history. "To put the matter
bluntly," Kelly complained of Colegrove v. Green,4" "Mr. Justice Black,
in order to prove his point, mangled constitutional history."4 6 Kelly admitted being blunt, but in truth he was mild; so was the term Murphy
used-"distressing" 47-- to describe Black's opinion in Engle v. Vitale.4 8
"[F]or the most part he relied upon works which may be 'historical'
given the length of time in the past they were written, but which modem
scholars would hesitate to suggest an undergraduate rely upon as anything but a once important, although now outdated view. '
Lawyers should be forgiven if they imagine a sigh accompanying
Robert L. Schuyler's lament: "Unfortunately, a knowledge of American
history has not yet been made a prerequisite for admission to the
Supreme Court."5 0
III.

FORENSIC HISTORY

We may wonder if Schuyler meant what he said. Historians understand that criticism of law office history is criticism of forensic advocacy;
that lawyers practicing lawyer's history use it as advocates; that the complaint is that they are too much the lawyer and not enough the historian." Historians know lawyers are beyond reformation, but wish judges
would adopt a more acceptable standard. The United States Supreme
Court, Kelly concluded, has "attempted to sit on two stools at once and
45. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
46. Kelly, supra note I, at 135.
47. Murphy, supra note 28, at 64.
48. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
49. Murphy, supra note 28, at 65. Wilcomb E. Washburn listed 13 books quoted or cited
as authority by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,
448 U.S. 371 (1980), and concluded: "Of all the historians cited, only the last few mentioned
meet the test of a historian by the standards of the profession today." Washburn, supra note
37, at 7.
50. ROBERT L. SCHUYLER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF ITS FORMATION 92 (1923).
5 1. "The object of this process is not objective truth, historical or otherwise, but advocacy
....
The premises, the processes of inquiry, and the results are all radically different from
those of a historian or a social scientist." Kelly, supra note 1, at 156. There have, however,
been historians who do not recognize the distinction. See, e.g., POCOCK, supra note 15, at 255-

305 (discussing development of "common-law mind").
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has fallen between them. It has confused the writing of briefs with the
writing of history." 52
Although their opinions may often be confused, the judges generally

are not. When they tell their law clerks53 to find them some "history"

supporting a point of law they plan to promulgate, their interest lies in

authority, not in evidence. This use of history is not to learn about the
past, but merely to support an outcome. Law office history does not lead

the judge to a decision. In almost every instance when history is employed, the decision has already been formulated. Unprofessional history
is used to explain the decision, to make the decision more palatable, or,

in most cases, to justify the decision.
History's great attractiveness for judges occurs when they are indulging in judicial activism. History lets them be activists "in the name
of constitutional continuity."54 Kermit L. Hall, a legal historian and law
professor, thinks this is a reason why judges should not play around with
history, especially when thinking they have discovered "original intent."'5 5 "[T]here is the real danger, as our constitutional history shows,

that we will come to believe that choices of law can be passively made by
the discovery of a single 'original intent' that will free our own generation

56
from the difficult social choices that it must make."
Even if his purpose was to defend the integrity of history57 rather
than the autonomy of law, Hall's condemnation of historical adjudication is too restrictive. We have to learn to harass historical jurispru-

52. Kelly, supra note 1, at 155.
53. Along with judges, law clerks have taken some hard knocks from historians. "It is not
certain... that the change was for the better when the practice developed of having law clerks,
as untrained in the arts of the historian as are the Justices themselves, hurriedly erect historical
scaffoldings to sustain structures already built by strong men of strong conviction." Howe,
supra note 24, at 16; see also Murphy, supra note 28, at 76 (asserting that law clerks choose
evidence in one-sided manner, or distort record, to avoid distressing judge); Washburn, supra
note 37, at 7-8 (asserting that reliance on out-dated views stems from antihistorical bias of law
clerks whose research and drafts of opinions are ultimately issued as decisions).
54. Kelly, supra note 1, at 131.
[T]his use of history has often been undertaken to break precedent and enable a
justice to get around established law. The famous Dred Scott case of 1857, which
involved the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, found Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney declaring that, as a matter of history, persons of African-American descent
had no rights that white persons were bound to respect. Since, Taney concluded, the
framers had not intended for African-Americans to be covered by the Bill of Rights,
then there was no way they could share in those rights-ever.
Kermit L. Hall, The Bill of Rights, Liberty, and OriginalIntent, in CRUCIBLE OF LIBERTY:
200 YEARS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 8,14 (Raymond Arsenault ed., 1991).
55. Hall, supra note 54, at 21.
56. Id.
57. Historians are not alone in thinking history needs to be defended from judges. Thus, a
constitutional law professor wrote:
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dence, not reject it, as most observers who have written on the subject
would want to do. Historical adjudication is too convenient to be banished from decision writing. We should acknowledge that lawyers and
judges can use history in a variety of ways and that not every exercise of
historical jurisprudence deserves to be dismissed as law office history.
According to the academic canons of the historical method, there is
no need to consider instances of the proper use of history either to prove
a fact"8 or to establish a point of law-if such instances can be found. 9

Instead, attention should be given to a species of history that does not
meet the canons of historians' history, but for centuries has made legiti-

mate contributions to Anglo-American law, especially to Anglo-American constitutional law. It is forensic history.
A.

Ancient Constitutionalism

The practice of ancient constitutionalism was the most persistent,
long-lived use of forensic history by common lawyers. Sometimes called
the gothic constitution, the ancient constitution was the suppositive aboriginal political structure of Anglo-Saxon society, the origins of which
By superficial and purposive interpretations of the past, the Court has dishonored the
arts of the historian and degraded the talents of the lawyer. Such dishonoring and
degrading may not be of large moment when the history that the Court manipulates
is merely "legal history"-the story, that is, of the law's internal growth and development. When, however, the Court endeavors to write an authoritative chapter in the
intellectual history of the American people, as it does when it lays historical foundations beneath its readings of the First Amendment, then any distortion becomes a
matter of consequence. The misreading is of moment not because it has led the
Court to a mistaken decision-for the decision may well be right and wise-but
because it has woven synthetic strands into the tapestry of American history.
HOWE, supra note 29, at 4.
58. When criticizing judges' use of history, historians tend to compound law and fact, not
realizing that when they cite a "proper" use of history it is used to prove facts, not law. The
following is an example in which a historian showed up the lawyers:
In the Sioux case [United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980)], the
"smoking gun" ... was the discovery of a confidential letter from Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan .

.

. reporting .

.

. [that] the President had decided that the

military should make no further resistance to the occupation of the Black Hills by
miners .... T]he attorneys for the Sioux in the Black Hills case gave Professor Fred
Nicklason, a historian .... three days to turn up evidence that Grant secretly ordered the army out of the Black Hills where they were stationed to prevent the gold
miners from invading the land the Sioux held .... The Sioux attorneys' charge that
Grant had so acted was undocumented, and the government attorneys pointed out
...

that no evidence existed in the record ...

that Grant had ever taken such an

action. Nicklason, employing his historian's training and intuition, bypassed official
military correspondence and went directly to General Sheridan's private papers at
the Library of Congress. . . . The five minutes work was probably worth over
$100,000,000 to the Sioux.
Washburn, supra note 37, at 8.
59. Perhaps judges never reach decisions about law on the basis of "a critical understanding of the historical facts involved" in a case. Id.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:193

are discoverable in the mythology of the forests of prehistoric Germany.
It was the norm of governance, that is, of the Anglos, the Saxons, and the
Jutes when they were said by ancient constitutionalists to have been free
people living under elected kings vested with limited power and confined
by the rule of customary law. For lawyers, constitutionalists, and parliamentarians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the ancient constitution provided a standard with which to argue against the actions,
programs, and decrees of contemporary government. The further that a
governmental command deviated from the supposed model of the ancient
constitution of liberty, the more it could be opposed as unconstitutional,
or, at least, challenged as an act of "power" rather than an act of
,6
"right. 0
The ancient constitution was timeless, a concept historians find fantastic, but which once fit comfortably into the historiography of English
lawyers. After all, that was how they thought of the common law. As
William Dugdale noted during the reign of Charles I,
the Common Law, is, out of question, no less antient than the
beginning of differences betwixt man and man, after the first
Peopling of this Land; it being no other than pure and tryed
Reason,... or the absoluteperfection of Reason, as Sir Edward
Coke affirmeth, adding, that the ground thereof is beyond the
memory or Register of any beginning ....61
Dugdale's point must not be missed. He is telling us not to look for
historical certainty. The ancient constitution was shaped by subjective,
not objective, proof.
The timelessness of the ancient constitution served the polemical
needs of forensic constitutionalists in political debate. The concept of
timelessness allowed the advocate for certain legal principles or legal institutions to place those principles or institutions in the context of continual constitutionality even if repudiated by the Crown or rendered
60. It is important to understand, however, that the premises of the ancient constitution
could be and sometimes were appealed to by the government-the Crown-to support a position it favored. The ancient constitution as a tool of constitutional argumentation was not
restricted to opponents of power, although, of course, over time they made much greater use of
it. See Paul Christianson, Ancient Constitutions in the Age of Sir Edward Coke and John Selden, in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY: MAGNA CARTA, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION OF RULE OF LAW 89, 104-15 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1993)
[hereinafter THE RooTs OF LIBERTY].

61. WILLIAM DUGDALE, ORIGINES JURIDICIALES, OR HISTORICAL MEMORIALS OF THE
ENGLISH LAWS, COURTS OF JUSTICE, FORMS OF TRYAL, PUNISHMENT IN CASES CRIMINAL,
LAW-WRITERS, LAw-BooKS, GRANTS AND SETTLEMENTS OF ESTATES, DEGREE OF SERJEANT, INNES OF COURT AND CHANCERY 3 (n.p., 2d ed. 1671).
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inoperative by nonusage.62 Even a constitutional custom of long standing did not necessarily supersede the timeless validity of a doctrine that
had been fundamental to the ancient constitution.
A case in point is the way in which, at the quite late date of 1783,
the Crown's discretionary right to create peers was questioned. In the
reign of Henry VIII, it was charged, "a power was usurped by the Crown
of conferring titles of dignity at pleasure; which incroachment, not being
opposed by the Commons, has been continued to this day, contrary to the
ancient law and constitution of the kingdom."6 3 The word to be marked
is encroachment. The practice, which could be traced back at least to
Henry VIII, even as late as 1783, was deemed an "encroachment" on the
timeless principles of the ancient constitution. The fact that three hundred years had come and gone since the "usurpation" was first introduced was, despite the doctrine of prescription, irrelevant to the
jurisprudence of ancient constitutionalism. The usurpation had not become law either because the Crown had no prescriptive rights against the
ancient constitution, or because time did not run against immutable
principles.
Because American lawyers and historians are largely unfamiliar
with ancient constitutionalism, it may be well to rephrase what has been
said. As a forensic technique, ancient constitutionalism was less history
than advocacy, more imagination than scholarship, yet real enough to be
the basic tool for both constitutional argumentation and for the defense
of collective liberty. The forensic strengths of the methodology are striking. To gain polemical advantage when contending for a legal doctrine
or against the exercise of power, one needed only: (1) to postulate a timeless continuity-an ancient constitution whose origins and functions
were lost in infinity; or (2) to postulate a customary tradition that had
been practiced from an era to which "the memory of man runneth not to
the contrary." Once these premises were in place, any government innovations to which one objected could be challenged as subversive of the
62. For a lengthy discussion of the historiography of ancient constitutionalism, see John
Phillip Reid, The Jurisprudenceof Liberty: The Ancient Constitution in the Legal Historiography of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, in THE RooTS OF LIBERTY, supra note 60, at
147, 147-231.

63. [WILLIAM W. SEWARD], THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE ASSERTED, AND THE NECESSITY OF A MORE EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT STATED AND PROVED 37 (Dublin,
1783).
Note: In pamphlets printed around the time of the American Revolution, the author's
name was frequently omitted in order to avoid potential prosecution and possible execution.
Accordingly, throughout this Essay, brackets appearing around an author's name indicate that
such person is now widely held to be the author although his or her name does not appear on
the cited pamphlet.-Eds.
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ancient constitution or of established legal custom. If there had been
alterations in constitutional government that could not be denied-substantial departures from earlier constitutional practice-they could be
dismissed as matters of mere form, not amounting to fundamental
change. As Charles Leslie explained during the first decade of the eighteenth century: "If you ask whether these things are not an Altering or
Breach of the Constitution, I think not. For while the Fountain Constitution stands Secure, any various Runnings of the Rivulets are no Breach of
the Constitution."" What mattered was not recent practices or changing
customs, but rather the timeless "first principles" of ancient constitutionalism. With the quality of timelessness, the ancient constitution was always available as a standard when arguments were made for correcting
the rivulets of erroneous details.
B.

Magna Carta: The Spirit of the Ancient Constitution Personified

"Was there an ancient constitution?" J.C. Holt asked.6 5 "The answer is 'no.' "66 True, but Holt's answer is a historian's answer, not a
lawyer's answer. The difference may be seen by considering contrasting
interpretations of the ancient constitution and of Magna Carta, the document that is Holt's chief area of historical expertise. For him, as for
historians in general, the ancient constitution was a fiction. It never had
a meaning. By contrast, Magna Carta had been a real historical happening: Its original meaning was its current meaning, and had always been
such since first promulgated by King John and his barons.
Lawyers once had a different perspective. There was a time when
they thought that the ancient constitution was no more a fiction than
they thought that Magna Carta had been changeless. Jean Louis de
Lolme, an eighteenth-century Swiss writer, may not have been a common
lawyer. Yet, he took a common lawyer's approach to interpreting
Magna Carta; that is, he interpreted it by taking into account what
Maitland described as "[t]hat process by which old principles and old
phrases are charged with an [sic] new content."6 7 Maitland knew it was
a process of evolution. It is "from the lawyer's point of view an evolution
64. [CHARLES LESLIE], THE CONSTITUTION, LAWS AND GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND,
VINDICATED IN A LETTER TO THE REVEREND MR. WILLIAM HIGDEN. ON ACCOUNT OF
His VIEW OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY
OF THE PRINCE, &C. IN VINDICATION OF THE LAWFULNESS OF TAKING THE OATHS, &C. 17
(London, 1709).

65. J.C. Holt, The Ancient Constitution in Medieval England, in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY,
supra note 60, at 22, 22.

66. Id.
67. MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 491.
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of the true intent and meaning of the old law; from the historian's point
of view it is almost of necessity a process of perversion and misunderstanding."6 King John's charter, de Lolme contended, had evolved into
a landmark of liberty, guaranteeing the rights of the general mass of the
people, not just the privileges of the feudal magnates who forced John to
sign.6 9 To make his point, de Lolme did not need to cite specific articles,
offer historical evidence, or discuss "original intent." Just to mention the
"Great Charter" seems to have been enough to remind eighteenth-century readers of what they already knew-that Magna Carta was virtually
a bill of individual rights.
[W]hat extent, what caution, do we see in the provisions made
by that Great Charter! All the objects for which Men naturally
wish to live in a state of Society, were settled in its thirty-eight
articles. The judicial authority was regulated. The person and
property of the individual were secured. The safety of the
Merchant and Stranger was provided for. The higher class of
Citizens gave up a number of oppressive privileges which they
had long since accustomed themselves to look upon as their
undoubted rights. Nay, the implements of tillage of the Bondman, or Slave, were also secured to him; and for the first time
perhaps in the annals of the World, a civil war was terminated
by making stipulations in favour of those unfortunate Men to
whom the avarice and lust of dominion inherent in human Nature, continued, over the greatest part of the Earth, to deny the
common rights of Mankind.7 0
Whether wishful thinking or factual nonsense, analysis of this sort
led some people to wonder if eighteenth-century encomiasts of Magna
Carta ever read the document.7 1 Perhaps that is the wrong question, just
as it could be wrong to ask today's First Amendment lawyers if they
really believe that Amendment, when originally promulgated, had been
intended to protect libellers from civil liability. By the time de Lolme
wrote, in the second half of the eighteenth century, Magna Carta could
68. Id.
69. J.L. DE

LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND, OR AN ACCOUNT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT; IN WHICH IT IS COMPARED WITH THE REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND OCCASIONALLY WITH THE OTHER MONARCHIES IN EUROPE 17 (Dublin,

1775).
70. Id. at 188.
71. Magna Carta, it was said, was "most boasted by those who never read it. Those who
have, can see that it is not at all in favour of what is fondly called the natural liberty of
mankind, and only calculated for the benefit of the few landed tyrants who extorted it from
their weak sovereign." AN ESSAY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 11 (London, 1765).
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be forensically described as an instrument containing "the common
rights of mankind," even if none of those rights had ever occurred to the
barons who confronted King John. There was little reason for eighteenth-century constitutionalists to read the document. What was important to them about Magna Carta was not what it said, but what its words
had come to mean and the uses to which they could be put. It was forensic history in the extreme. Had King John died on the way to Runnymede and Magna Carta never been issued, eighteenth-century
constitutionalists would have "quoted" in its stead some other official or
suppositive declaration of restraints on Norman government power-the
coronation charter of Henry I perhaps.7 2 Magna Carta was, after all, but
a medieval codicil reaffirming the ancient constitution. That was the accepted theory of the eighteenth century. Sir William Blackstone insisted
that
it is agreed by all our historians that the great charter of King
John was for the most part compiled from the antient customs
of the realm, or the laws of King Edward the confessor; by
which they usually mean the old common law, which was established under our Saxon princes, before the rigors of feodal
tenure and other hardships were imported from the continent
by the kings of the norman line.7 3
The Irish barrister Charles Francis Sheridan agreed, even though he attacked Blackstone's jurisprudence on other grounds. "Magna Carta
however distant the date of it," he argued, "was even then only declaratory of the Principal Grounds of fundamental laws and liberties long antecedent to itself, and consequently still longer antecedent to the very
existence of Parliaments." 74
The jurisprudence of Magna Carta in the eighteenth century, therefore, was a rejection of arbitrary monarchical power. 75 A pamphlet that
the American colonists attributed to Lord Chancellor Somers insisted
72. Coronation Charterof Henry I (Aug. 5, 1100), in 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS

400-02 (David C. Douglas & George W. Greenaway eds., 1953).
73. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE GREAT CHARTER AND CHARTER

OF THE FOREST,

WITH OTHER AUTHENTIC INSTRUMENTS at vii (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1759).

74. [CHARLES F. SHERIDAN], OBSERVATIONS ON THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY SIR
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, RESPECTING THE EXTENT OF THE POWER OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT, PARTICULARLY WITH RELATION TO IRELAND. IN A LETTER TO SIR WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, WITH A POSTSCRIPT ADDRESSED TO LORD NORTH UPON THE AFFAIRS OF
THAT COUNTRY 5-6 (London, 1779).
75. For the legal significance of the concept of "arbitrary"in the old English constitution,

see John Phillip Reid, In Legitimate Stirps: The Concept of "'Arbitrary," the Supremacy of

Parliament,and the Coming of the American Revolution, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 459, 459-99
(1977).
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that the rights that Magna Carta enunciated "were not the grants and
concessions of our Princes, but recognitions of what we have reserv'd
unto ourselves in the original institution of our government, and of what
always appertain'd unto us, by common law, and immemorial customs." 7 6 Magna Carta, in that version, was a restatement of the ancient
constitution, "[declarative] of ancient rights" according to a late eighteenth-century political catechism;" "declaratory of the principal
Grounds, of thefundamental Laws and Liberties of England," according
to a New England newspaper.78
Reduced to its essentials, the legal theory was pure ancient constitutionalism. Like the ancient constitution, the provisions of Magna Carta
were traced back through a timeless and changeless infinity. Samuel
Johnson noted in 1772 that
[t]he contents of Magna Charta [are] the undoubted inheritance
of England, being their antient and approved laws; so antient,
that they seem to be of the same standing with the nation ....
[T]hey passed through all the British, Roman, Danish, Saxon,
and Norman times, with little or no alteration in the main.7 9
What this statement intended, of course, was not to teach a lesson in
history, but to propagate a principle of constitutional law. "The Rights
of Magna Charta depend not on the Will of the Prince, or the Will of the
Legislature," Connecticut lawmakers were told in an annual election sermon, "but they are the inherent natural Rights of Englishmen: secured
and confirmed they may be by the Legislature, but not derived from nor
76. [LORD CHANCELLOR SOMERS], THE JUDGMENT OF WHOLE KINGDOMS AND NATIONS, CONCERNING THE RIGHTS, POWER, AND PREROGATIVE OF KINGS, AND THE RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES, & PROPERTIES OF THE PEOPLE 20 (Newport, R.I., 12th ed. 1774).
77. [ROBERT ROBINSON], A POLITICAL CATECHISM 34-35 (London, 1782).
78. BOSTON GAZETTE, May 10, 1756, at 1. The Gazette echoed a frequently reprinted
pamphlet that was written around 1690. See HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE
FREE-BORN SUBJECT'S INHERITANCE 7 (Providence, 6th ed. 1774) (containing Magna Carta,

ChartaDe Foresta,Statute de TallagioNon Concedendo, Habeas CorpusAct, and several other
statutes, with comments on each). Magna Carta "is only an Abridgment of the ancient Laws
and Customs of the Realm. Of the same Nature is the Petition of Rights [sic] .... ." THE
AMERICAN GAZETTE. BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE AUTHENTIC ADDRESSES, MEMORIALS, LETTERS, &C. WHICH RELATE TO THE PRESENT DISPUTES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND HER COLONIES. CONTAINING ALSO MANY ORIGINAL PAPERS NEVER BEFORE
PUBLISHED 48 (London, 1768). The connection with the Petition was also old theory.

"Magna Charta, instead of being superannuated, renews and recovers its pristine strength, and
athletick vigor, by the Petition of Right, with our many other explanatory or declaratory Statutes." [THOMAS RYMER], A PROSPECT OF GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE, AND CIVIL POLICY:
SHEWING THE ANTIQUITY, POWER, DECAY OF PARLIAMENTS 67 (London, 1681).

79. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A HISTORY AND DEFENCE OF MAGNA CHARTA 3-4 (London, 2d
ed. 1772).
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dependent on their Will.""0 These words were preached in 1744. They
stated the precise legal principle upon which Americans would fight their
revolution thirty-two years later.
C. American Constitutionalism: The Second Original Contract
The controversy between Great Britain and her thirteen mainland
colonies that led to the American Revolution is another occasion when
forensic historical argumentation was a chief form of constitutional discourse. There is no need to consider all the historical aspects of the debate. The techniques of advocacy can be sufficiently illustrated by
considering just one forensic tool: the concept of the original contract
that the English people had negotiated with their rulers at some infinite
period in the prehistoric past. Contractarian theory shaped the heart of
the American constitutional case-with the exception of custom-as the
basic legal authority of traditional English and British constitutionalism.
In eighteenth-century Great Britain, many political theories and almost
all constitutional theory were expressed by contractarian thought. It was
adapted to every issue and stood as a standard that could be used to
resolve every problem. During the revolutionary controversy, both
sides-even British governmental employees, spokesmen for the constitution of imperial sovereign command-appealed to contractarian theory, making similar constitutional arguments for similar constitutional
reasons.
For purposes of illustration, we need only consider one of the shapes
that contractarian argument took during the American Revolution.
"[O]ur forefathers," the people of the town of Weymouth, Massachusetts
lamented shortly before the Stamp Act8 became operative,
have told us that they should never have left the land of their
nativity, and fled to these ends of the earth, triumph'd over
dangers, encountered difficulties innumerable, and suffer'd
hardships unparrel'd, but for the sake of securely enjoying civil
and religious liberty, and that the same might be transmitted
safe to their posterity.8 2
80. [ELISHA WILLIAMS], THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS. A
SEASONAL PLEA FOR THE LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT, IN MATTERS OF RELIGION, WITHOUT ANY CONTROUL FROM HUMAN AUTHORITY.
BEING A LETTER, FROM A GENTLEMAN IN THE MASSACHUSETTS-BAY TO His FRIEND IN
CONNECTICUT 65 (Boston, 1744).
81. 1765, 5 Geo. 3, cap. XII (Eng.).
82. Instructions of the Town of Weymouth, BOSTON

EVENING-POST,

Oct. 21, 1765, at 2.
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The voters of Weymouth were applying the original contract, not the
"social" contract, which also was a doctrine of ancient Anglo-Saxon law,
often associated by American historians with the theories of John Locke.
The social contract was a legal fiction explaining the stipulations under
which individuals left the state of nature and created societies. The constitutional or government contract-called the original contract in the
eighteenth century-was an implied agreement between ruler and ruled
from which the powers and limitations of government were inferred.
The first is a theory of the origin of society, the second a theory of the
constitution of government.83
Unlike the social contract, the original contract did not depend on
theories about the need of humans to escape the state of nature. It was
implied from historical events and was based on principles of government
that the person citing the contract either wanted continued or hoped to
establish. It would be wrong, therefore, to think of legal fictions or of
constitutional subterfuge. The original contract was much more real
than the twentieth century is willing to credit. As late as 1992, a writer
described contractarian argument as "modern," a development of the
"radicalism" of the American Revolution that supplanted "the traditional patriarchal idea of authority."84 That writer was imposing twentieth-century suppositions on eighteenth-century constitutional concepts.
Seen from a less speculative perspective, that is, as seen through eighteenth-century suppositions, the original contract was an ancient constitutional doctrine that for centuries had been employed as a forensic
argument restraining power, while patriarchalism is modern theory invented to accommodate an otherwise unsupportable historical thesis.85
The concept of contract was an apparatus of constitutionalism imposing restraints on the prerogatives of monarchy stretching back beyond legal memory, to the pledge of King Canute to govern by the
Anglo-Saxon customs of Edgar, the promise of William the Conqueror to
continue the laws of Edward the Confessor, the coronation charter of
Henry I, and most notably, the several versions of Magna Carta. It was
popular knowledge in the eighteenth century that Charles I had been
executed for violating his compact with the English and Scottish nations.
"'There is,' he was told on being sentenced to death, 'a contract and a
bargain made between the King and his people, and your oath is taken:
83. John Phillip Reid, "In Our Contracted Sphere" The Constitutional Contract, the
Stamp Act Crisis, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 21-28
(1976).
84. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 166 (1992).
85. Id.
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and certainly, Sir, the bond is reciprocal .... ,,86 The contract that had
been invoked against the father was later breached by the son. Although
as a matter of precise law, James II had been accused of abandoning the
throne, in the popular mind of the eighteenth century he had been deposed for breaking the original contract. The King, in the words of the
Massachusetts House of Representatives, not only violated "the original
contract with his three kingdoms," he "broke the original contract of the
settlement and government of these colonies. "8"
Discussing the American Revolution in the House of Lords, the
Earl of Rockingham protested against Parliament's attempts to bind the
colonies by punitive legislation. He had hoped to locate the constitutional limits of Parliament's authority in either the doctrine of consent or
the doctrine of contract. "I don't love to claim a right on the foundation
of the supreme power of the legislature over the dominions of the Crown
of Great Britain," Rockingham explained.18 Instead he looked for American acquiescence in "an original tacit compact."8 9 Unable to find it, he
refused to vote to violate the contract that he thought existed."
The contract to which Rockingham referred was not the original
contract between the rulers of England and the English people. It was a
different, more recent original contract, one made between the rulers of
England or Great Britain and the first settlers of the American colonies.
This can be called the second original contract. The historical event
upon which this contractarian doctrine was based was the departure of
seventeenth-century English people from the mother country and their
emigration to North America. Those first settlers, a governor of Rhode
Island explained in 1765, "removed on a firm reliance of a solemn compact, and royal promise and grant, that they, and their successors forever, should be free; should be partakers and sharers in all the privileges
and advantages of the then English, now British constitution."9 The
legal theory as explained by a London magazine was pure implied
contract:
86. Reid, supra note 83, at 23 (quoting C. WEDGWOOD, THE TRIAL OF CHARLES 1 182

(1964)).
87. Id. at 23-24.
88. Id. at 25 (quoting G.H. GUTrRIDGE, ENGLISH WHIGGISM AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 74 (1966)).
89. Id. (quoting G.H. GUTTRIDGE, ENGLISH WHIGGISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLU-

74 (1966)).
90. Id. (quoting G.H. GUTTRIDGE, ENGLISH WHIGGISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 74 (1966)).
TION

91. STEPHEN HOPKINS, THE RIGHTS OF THE COLONIES EXAMINED (Paul Campbell ed.,

Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation 1974) (1765).

November 1993]

LAW AND HISTORY

Before [the first settlers of the colonies departed], the terms of
their freedom, and the relation they should stand in to the
mother country, in their emigrant state were fully settled.
[T]hey were to remain subject to the king, and dependent on
the kingdom of Great Britain. In return they were to receive
protection, and enjoy all the rights and privileges of freeborn
Englishmen .92
There were two elements providing validity to the second original
contract: the right of the king to make an agreement and the reliance or
expectations of the settlers. As the New York Journalexplained, having
been "invested with authority by the whole nation, which gave a sanction
to his action, [the king] ... made a contract with the colonists, on the
faith of which they trusted the lives and fortunes of themselves and their
posterity." 93 Although the contract was implied, the eighteenth-century
legal mind was so attuned to contractarian theory that the terms were
often explained as mutual promises exchanged between monarch and
subjects. For example, consider how the Boston Evening-Post wrote the
contract in 1765:
That if the adventurers will hazard their lives and properties in
acquiring, according to the rules of justice, possessions in the
desart regions of America... they shall lose no part of their
natural rights, liberty and property, by such removal; but that
they, and all their posterity for ever, shall as fully and freely
enjoy them, to all intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever, as ifthey and every of them were born in England.9 a
The second original contract was both a legal fiction and a historical
event. For seventeenth- and eighteenth-century constitutional advocates,
the second original contract was an actual document. These advocates
spoke of kings agreeing to its terms and of the contractees' descendants
reading provisions of the contract.95 The second original contract was
cited as evidence of constitutional rights all throughout the American
colonial era. For example, in 1691, following the New England rebellion
against the prerogative taxation imposed by Governor Edmund Andros,
John Palmer, the most competent common lawyer in Governor Andros's
administration, defended prerogative taxes on the grounds that North
America was conquered territory and subject to prerogative decrees. Ed92. 35 GENTLEMAN'S MAG. (London) 561 (1765).
93. BOSTON EVENING-POST, Mar. 8, 1773 (Supp.), at 1 (quoting New York Journal).
94. BOSTON EVENING-POST, July 1, 1765, at 1.
95. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:
THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 136, 150 (1986).
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ward Rawson, answering Palmer, denied the fact of conquest, and countered with the second original contract, stating its terms close to those
asserted by American whigs eighty years later during the revolutionary
controversy:
[T]here was an Original Contract between the King and the
first Planters in New-England, the King promising them, if they
at their own cost and charge would subdue a Wilderness, and
enlarge his Dominions, they and their Posterity after them
should enjoy such Priviledges as are in their Charters expressed, of which that of not having Taxes imposed on them
96
without their own consent was one.
Rawson is not as clear as we would wish. It may be that he would
have limited the second original contract to rights stated or implied in
colonial charters. If so, his rule of construction was narrower than that
adopted by most Americans who cited, used, and relied on the second
original contract. They would have found the terms of the contract in a
much wider range of evidence: actual statements made by or on behalf of
the Crown, the conditions of emigration, the understanding- expressed
or implied-of the emigrants, and subsequent government practice and
legal custom. From the twentieth-century perspective, this proof appears
difficult to obtain and easily challenged on grounds of relevancy or directness. The eighteenth-century constitutional mind apparently believed the contract readily proven. James Wilson wrote:
However difficult it may be in other states, to prove an original
contract, subsisting in any other manner, and on any other conditions, than are naturally and necessarily implied in the very
idea of the first institution of a state; it is the easiest thing imaginable to prove it in our constitution and to ascertain some of
the material articles of which it consists.97
Wilson was referring to the original contract in British constitutional law. Daniel Dulany, Jr. thought it was even easier to prove the
second original contract. "The Origin of other Governments," he explained, "is covered by the Veil of Antiquity, and is differently traced by
the Fancies of different Men; but, of the Colonies, the Evidence of it is as
96. [EDWARD RAWSON], THE REVOLUTION IN NEW ENGLAND JUSTIFIED, AND THE
PEOPLE THERE VINDICATED FROM THE ASPERSIONS CAST UPON THEM BY MR. JOHN
PALMER, IN His PRETENDED ANSWER TO THE DECLARATION, PUBLISHED BY THE INHABITANTS OF BOSTON, AND THE COUNTRY ADJACENT, ON THE DAY WHEN THEY SECURED THEIR LATE OPPRESSORS, WHO ACTED BY AN ILLEGAL AND ARBITRARY
COMMISSION FROM THE LATE KING JAMES 43 (Boston, 1691).

97. James Wilson, Speech in the PennsylvaniaConvention, January1775, reprintedin THE
DEBATE ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1761-1783 at 178 (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1960).
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clear and unequivocal as of any other Fact."9 This was forensic history
at its most effective.
During the revolutionary controversy, contractarian theory was appealed to more than any other jurisprudential doctrine, especially on the
issue of Parliament's authority to bind the colonies by legislation "in all
cases whatsoever." 9 9 What must be noticed, however, is how much the
principle of custom was involved in every aspect of the American whig
case. Custom provided proof of the contents of the second original contract-its terms, stipulations, and provisos. It was one thing for Americans to contend that the first settlers to the colonies had contracted with
Charles I on leaving England. All that claim did was allege the second
original contract; it said nothing explicit about the contract's terms. The
various stipulations of the contract also had to be established, and that
was done primarily through the evidence of custom. The contract, remember, was about how future generations of Americans would be governed. Its provisions, therefore, were found by looking at how
contemporary colonists and their predecessors had been governed-by
looking, that is, at custom as well as at how colonial government currently functioned.
D. The Institutionalizationof ForensicHistory
The practice of forensic history by either English common lawyers
or American whigs under the unwritten British constitution was quite
different from the practice of forensic history under the written American federal and state constitutions. The methodology is the same: to
find, argue, or invent some history that bears on the question at bar and
use it as authority similar to a judicial precedent, rather than as evidence
to explain the past. What differs is that the practice of forensic history
under the American constitutions has been institutionalized. The audience is different. Under the old English and British constitutions, the
polemists of history, whether constitutionalists or monarchy absolutists,"° directed their arguments at public or parliamentary opinion.
98.

[DANIEL DULANY, JR.], CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROPRIETY OF IMPOSING TAXES

IN THE BRITISH COLONIES, FOR THE PURPOSE OF RAISING A REVENUE, BY
MENT 30 (Annapolis, 2d ed. 1765).

Acr OF PARLIA-

99. An Act for the Better Securing the Dependency of his Majesty's Dominions in
America upon the Crown and Parliament of Great Britain, 1766, 6 Geo. 3, cap. XII (Eng.).
100. This is a point that bears repeating: Although forensic history may have been more
useful for those opposing the exercise of power, it could also be put in the service of government power, especially when supported by scientific history. This can be seen in the career of
Robert Brady, whom historians in the twentieth century have made into a sort of folk hero. A
scholar with the vision and intelligence to be the good historian, he courageously, but in vain,
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American forensic history is directed at courts, usually appellate courts.
Thus, when directed at public or professional opinion, forensic history is
generally propagated from the bench, 1"' especially by the United States
Supreme Court.
Hugo Black was the Supreme Court's chief practitioner of law office
history. None of the numerous uses of history in his decisions can pass
muster as historians' history. If we are generous, however, it could be
conceded that in one opinion at least, United States v. Lovett, 10 2 Black
edged close to forensic history. At issue was the validity of section 304 of
the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943,103 directing that no

salary or other compensation be paid to certain government employees
named in the legislation."° "In the background of the statute," Black
noted, "lies the House of Representatives' feeling in the late thirties that
many 'subversives' were occupying influential positions in the Government and elsewhere and that their influence must not remain unchallenged."'0 5 He labelled the legislation "galling," saying it "accomplishes
the punishment of named individuals without a judicial trial,"' 1 6 a typical case of the type that generally turned his judicial instincts toward
historical adjudication. And, as usual, he wanted history not for evidence but to cite as authority, to use, that is, as lawyers use judicial
precedents.
Those who wrote our Constitution well knew the danger
inherent in special legislative acts which take away the life,
liberty, or property of particular named persons because the
legislature thinks them guilty of conduct which deserves punexposed the misconceptions and misrepresentations of those bad historians, the common lawyers who practiced ancient constitutionalism. Compare POCOCK, supra note 15, at 351 with
Reid, supra note 62, at 195-202.
101. An important exception, that may help to prove the rule as it occurred before the
creation of federal courts, is THE FEDERALIST Nos. 18-20 (James Madison).
102. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
103. Pub. L. No. 78-132, § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450 (1943) (held unconstitutional by Lovett,
328 U.S. 303; repealed in part by 72 Stat. 1272 (1958)).
104. No part of any appropriation, allocation, or fund (1) which is made available
under or pursuant to this Act, or (2) which is now, or which is hereafter made,
available under or pursuant to any other Act, to any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States, shall be used ... to pay any part of the salary, or
other compensation for the personal services, of Goodwin B. Watson, William E.
Dodd, Junior, and Robert Morss Lovett, unless prior to such date such person has
been appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate

Id.
105. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 308.
106. Id. at 316.
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ishment. They intended to safeguard the people of this country
10 7
from punishment without trial by duly constituted courts.
This was history by judicial fiat. There was no need to cite authority
except, of course, for another Hugo Black decision. 108 This is hardly evidence to persuade historians, but apparently the very thing needed to
satisfy Black that points of history had sufficiently been researched. All
that remained to reach judgment was to brush on a little more history.
"When our Constitution and Bill of Rights were written, our ancestors
had ample reason to know that legislative trials and punishments were
too dangerous to liberty to exist in the nation of free men they envisioned. And so they proscribed bills of attainder. Section 304 is one."109
For two other lawyers-Justices Felix Frankfurter and Stanley
Reed-Black's argument was much too forensic and not sufficiently historical. Black's scholarship was unpersuasive, Frankfurter complained.
It was, at best, a "gloss of history," he said in a concurring opinion written to set the historical record straight. 110 "When the framers of the
Constitution proscribed bills of attainder, they referred to a form of law
which had been prevalent in monarchical England and was employed in
the colonies," Frankfurter pointed out."' "They were familiar with its
nature; they had experienced its use; they knew what they wanted to
12
prevent."'
It must be recalled that the Constitution was framed in an era
when dispensing justice was a well-established function of the
legislature. The prohibition against bills of attainder must be
viewed in the background of the historic situation when moves
in specific litigation that are now conventional and, for the
most part, the exclusive concern of courts were commonplace
legislative practices. Bills of attainder were part of what now
are staple judicial functions which legislatures then exercised.
It was this part of their recognized authority which the Constitution prohibited when it provided that "No Bill of Attainder
... shall be passed." Section 304 lacks the characteristics of
the enactments in the Statutes of the Realm and the Colonial
13
Laws that bear the hallmarks of bills of attainder.'
107.
108.
tracing
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 317.
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1945) (defining limits of "martial law" by
history of military rule beginning in 17th century).
Lovett, 328 U.S. at 318.
Id. at 327 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 322 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Although Black may not have been a student of the historical
method, it should not be doubted that someone, perhaps his law clerks,
explained to him that Frankfurter had the better historical argument.
Bills of attainder had a reasonably exact meaning in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century English and British law, and that meaning did not
encompass legislation confiscating the salaries of officials out of favor
with Parliament. But Black, promulgating broad principles of constitutional law, was not to be controlled by historical canons accurately applied. Legislative docking of a culprit's salary without a judicial
determination of guilt may not have been a bill of attainder in the eighteenth century, but in the twentieth century it smelled enough like attainder to provide lawyers with a scent of forensic history. Black apparently
concluded that, although questions about the historicism of that forensic
history would be raised in the concurring opinion, his argument was
good enough as law. It got the Court where he wanted it to go.
Although he knew his history was forensic history, not historians' history, Black left it in the opinion.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Lawyers who think that Black's history was argument enough to
prove section 304 an unconstitutional bill of attainder need not be embarrassed. The legitimacy of forensic history cannot be left to the professional standards of academic historians. A different measure is needed,
one turning on the restraint historical adjudication clamps on judicial
discretion. Our problem is to separate history used to screen a judge's
activism from history that fixes the limits of decision. Perhaps the distinction cannot be tested, but at this stage of our knowledge we cannot be
sure.
There are no other decisions dealing with American constitutional
law that owe more to violations of the canons of historical interpretation
than those dealing with the establishment and free exercise of religion. A
"wall of separation" has been erected to create the doctrine of "Separation of Church and State,"' 14 ostensibly based on a letter Thomas Jeffer114. Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 9 (1949).
Actually, the Constitution does not mention this principle. In fact, it does not contain the word "church," nor yet the word "state" in the generic sense except in the
Second Amendment, in which a "well regulated militia" is asserted to be "necessary
to the security of a free state"; even the word "separation" fails to put in an appearance. These singular omissions-singular, if what the Framers wanted was "Separation of Church and State" in the Court's understanding of it-are now supplied by
the Court by the interpretation which it affixes to the "establishment of religion"
clause of the First Amendment.
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son wrote to Baptist ministers in Connecticut.' 15 Historians have been
amazed at how this evidence meets no canon of relevancy. Jefferson,
who coined the term "wall of separation," had no official connection
with the amendment of the Constitution that the Court was interpreting.
He was not a member of the committee that drafted it; he was not a
member of the Congress that proposed it to the states; and, most impor-

tant of all from the perspective of historical relevancy,116 he was not a
member of any of the state conventions that ratified it. I17 But to acknowledge that the doctrine rests on irrelevant history1 18 need not make

it bad law. Just as decisions holding that "[tihe First Amendment has
'
erected a wall between church and state" 119
have become judicial precedents binding on lower courts, so has Jefferson's quotation been repeated

so often it has assumed autonomous status as an example of forensic history. If it is not historically relevant as proof of the original meaning of
the First Amendment, it enjoys a somewhat greater forensic legitimacy
than some of the "history" currently being marshalled against it.' z°
Id.
115. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1946) ("In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation
between church and State.' "); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). Of course,
Black, who wrote the Everson opinion, cited "historical" authority for this quote: the Reynolds decision.
116. See generally Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understandingof Original Intent?, 5
CONST. COMMENTARY 77 (1988) (discussing historical actions of framers and ratifiers of Constitution to interpret "intent").
117. This point was also made in regard to the Supreme Court's use of letters written by
Jefferson advocating equal representation in both houses of the Virginia legislature to prove
something concerning the original intention of the framers.
To this it may be answered: (a) Jefferson was not at the Constitutional Convention;
(b) his ideas are not typical of those who were at the Convention; (c) the letters cited
by the Court were written thirty years after the Convention adjourned; and (d) Jefferson's apportionment plan was not adopted by Virginia.
CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 145 (1969).

118. Corwin states:
The eager crusaders on the Court make too much of Jefferson's Danbury letter,
which was not improbably motivated by an impish desire to heave a brick at the
Congregationalist-Federalist hierarchy of Connecticut, whose leading members had
denounced him two years before as an "infidel" and "atheist." A more deliberate,
more carefully considered evaluation of Jefferson on the religious clauses of the First
Amendment is that which occurs in his Second Inaugural: "In matters of religion, I
have considered that its free exercise is placed by the constitution independent of the
powers of the general government." In short, the principal importance of the amendment lay in the separation which it effected between the respective jurisdictions of
state and nation regarding religion, rather than in its bearing on the question of the
separation of church and state.
Corwin, supra note 114, at 14 (footnote omitted).
119. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
120. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 379-80
(1988).
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Whether there is a niche of legitimacy on which forensic history can
perch is a question that may depend on whether its scope can be limited
by generally accepted bounds. If historical jurisprudence is a tool of restraint, forensic history could be a peculiarly American aspect of the rule
of law. If so, it bears company with the much disparaged doctrine of
"original intent." Kermit Hall has doubts, however: "Imagining what
the framers would have said," he complains, "is often a sterile and all but
meaningless historical exercise. Too much has changed."' 2 1 His choice
of words is important. He says that original intent is a "meaningless
historical exercise," and so it may be. But is that the issue? The question
is not whether original intent or any other form of forensic history is a
meaningful historical exercise. The question should be whether it is a
meaningful judicial exercise. Adherence to the rule of law, it has been
pointed out, is why original intent is the single "legitimate means of applying the Constitution. Only that can give us law that is something
other than, and superior to, the judge's will.' 1 22 The same should be true
for forensic history in general if used with proper caution. By forcing the
judge to find objective evidence supporting a decision, use of forensic history, together with the authority of precedent, the doctrine of analogy,
the canons of evidence, and the maxims of relevancy, enforces the rule of
23
law, even if it does not rise to the level of academic scholarship.
Ancient constitutionalism, contractarianism, and original intentism,
along with other forms of forensic history, are some of the instruments
that have been used over the centuries to neutralize arbitrary power by
placing a rein on discretionary decision making. By limiting discretion,
including judicial discretion, forensic history both reinforced the rule of
law and protected law itself from the politics of the arbitrary state.' 2 4
As rules of judicial restraint go, forensic history may be relatively
anemic. Yet in constitutional adjudication it could undertake part of the
task once performed in Anglo-American constitutional law by the doctrine of custom: to assure that judgment in the case at bar is the judgment of many judges and not just one judge, of all generations and not
just this generation.' 2 As Frederick Schauer recently said of original
intentism:
121. Hall, supra note 54, at 21.
122. Robert H. Bork, OriginalIntent and the Constitution, 7 HUMAN. 22, 26 (1986).
123. John Phillip Reid, Originalismand Subjectivism in the Bicentennial Year, 68 Soc. Scl.

Q. 687, 699-700 (1987).
124. See William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA.
L. REV. 1237, 1265 (1986).
125. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:
THE AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE 153-56 (1991).
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For those who fear the risks of expansive judicial interpretation
of open-ended constitutional provisions, obedience to the commands of history provides a way of narrowing, albeit not completely, the options open to the conscientious judge. Here
history is used to control not exclusively or even primarily because an historical view of intent is special, but because it is a
pragmatic device for cabining the discretion of judges. There
might be other ways of achieving the same end: judges could be
told to always defer to the legislature when a textual command
was unclear; the range of materials to which judges could legitimately refer could be tightly constrained; a strong precedential
constraint could be imposed; or, judges could even be told that
they must toss a coin in cases of legal indeterminacy. Any of
these strategies would serve the same goal-limiting the discretion of judges, especially in the interpretation of such vague
due process of
provisions as "equal protection of the laws,....
law," "cruel and unusual punishment," and "the freedom of
speech." Reference to historical intent as a method for limiting
judicial discretion might still be thought to be more legitimate
or perhaps more constraining than some of those other techniques, but it is the constraint and not the legitimacy that under
this view justifies taking original intent as command. 26
That possibility is just as true for other forms of forensic history.
Yet the risks may be greater than history can guard against. As
critics of law office history often argue, historical jurisprudence has more
frequently been a shield hiding judicial activism than a method of restraining judicial discretion. "The danger that judges might wield power
not in the name of the Constitution but in the service of their own personal moral predilections," Kermit Hall warns, "is heightened, not reduced, by the habit of couching judicial determinations of rights in the
form of historical explanations." 12' 7 It is an open question, even when
judges employ the past in a good-faith effort toward neutral judgment,
whether they can, in fact, select by some historical method data that will
safely guide them to conclusions not predetermined by personal choice.

126. Frederick Schauer, The Varied Uses of ConstitutionalHistory, Introduction to WILLIAM E. NELSON & ROBERT C. PALMER, LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTION AND
RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1, 7 (1987).

127. Hall, supra note 54, at 21.
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